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THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND SCHOOL
SEGREGATION
HOWAuD JAY GRAiAM*.
Once again intense interest and scrutiny are focused on the
Fourteenth Amendment. The immediate occasion is the decision
now pending in the School Segregation Gases.' Held over from
1952 term at the Supreme Court's request, these five cases were
rebriefed and on December 7-9, 1953, elaborately reargued upon
a series of five questions framed by the justices. The five queries'
dealt with the purpose of the Amendment, the intent of framers
and ratifiers, and the respective powers, under Sections One and
Five, of Congress and the Judiciary. The first two questions
sought "evidence" of the intention with regard to the school
segregation issue. Question three related to the Court's existent
powers under the text of the Amendment, regardless of framer-
intent, in case historic evidence proved unclear or indecisive.
Questions four and five concerned the judicial mechanics for end-
ing segregation "assuming it is decided that segregation in public
schools violates the Fourteenth Amendment."
A Rip Van Winkle, awakening from an eighty-year nap, would
pinch himself in disbelief at these developments. The Fourteenth
Amendment,3 he would exclaim, had been drafted in 1866 to make
the former slaves citizens-to remove doubt about constitution-
ality of the Civil Rights Act of that year. That Act in turn, drawn
* Bibliographer, Los Angeles County Law Library (on leave of absence) and
Guggenheim Fellow, 1953-54.
1. Supreme Court of the United States, October, 1953 Term, docket numbers 1, 2.
4, 8, 10: Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka; Briggs v. Elliott; Davis v. County
School Board of Prince Edward County; Boiling v. Sharpe; Gebhari v. Belton. The
corresponding docket numbers of the cases, 1952 Term, were 8, 101, 191, 413, 448.
2. 345 U. S. 972 (1953) (memorandum decision).
3. Basic monographs ind articles on the history of the Fourteenth Amendment
and its major clauses are: FLACK, TiE ADOPTION "OF THE FOURTEENTH AmENDMENT
(1908) ; KENDRICK, JOURNAL OF THE JOINT Com-mrirrrEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION
(1914); Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?
The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REv. 5 (1949); Frank and Munro, The
Original Understanding of the "Equal Protection of the Laws", 50 COL. L. REV. 131
(1950); Graham, The "Conspiracy Theory" of the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 YALE:
L. J. 371 (1938), 48 YA.E L. J. 171 (1938) ; 1 SELECTED EssAYs CONSTITUTIONAL. LAW
236 (1938) ; McLaughlin, The Court, the Constitution and Conkling. 46 Am. HIST. REV.
45 (1940) ; Boudin, Truth and Fiction About the Fourteenth Amendment, 16 N. Y. U.
L. Q7 REv. 19 (1938); WARSOFF, EQUALITY AND THE LAW (1938); Graham, Early
Antislavery Backgrounds of the Fourteenth Amendment, [1950] Wis. L. REV. 470 and
610; Graham, Procedure to Substance-Extra-Judicial Rise of Due Process, 1830-1 60, 40
CALIF. L. REv. 483 (1953); TENBROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH
AmEND.ENT (1951); CRoSSE Y, POLmCS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY oF
THE UNITED STATES vol. 2, c. 31-32 (1953).
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by Senator Trumbull,", had been designed to secure to the freed-
men actual as well as nominal freedom, to root out slavery's
"badges and incidents," to outlaw public race discrimination.
The Fourteenth Amendment-universally understood as "em-
bodying" or "incorporating" this bill-and hence as reconstitut-
ing the powers of the Federal government to the extent needed to
erase the color line from American life-was ratified in 1868. Five
years later, in the Slaughter-House Cases, the Supreme Court
declared that the "one pervading purpose" of the Amendment,
and indeed of all three War Amendments, had been "the freedom
of the slave race [and] the security and firm establishment of that
freedom." '5 One can imagine Rip's puzzlement therefore on learn-
ing that since 1896,6 this Amendment, securing to all "persons"
the "equal protection of the laws," had nonetheless sanctioned
racial segregation in public schools, transportation, amusement,
etc. Chide us, this awakened sleeper well might, for proof he alone
had been napping!
Assuredly a sensitive American with an eye to the headlines
as well as histories 7 would have a very bad time bringing the old
gentleman down to date. These are the darkest chapters in our
past: Gradual, systematic breakdown- of Reconstruction; betrayal
of the South and Negroes alike; vindictive partisanship, reckless
Executive-Legislative warfare; shameless exploitation of sec-
tional hatreds and Negro suffrage; at length, military rule at dead
end, sectional stalemate, the freedmen and Negro race jettisoned
through this "separate but equal" cynicism, with its evasions and
insulting defenses.
To convey this-the combined substance of Reconstruction
history "and of Myrdal's An American DilemmaS--to one who had
experienced the thrill of Emancipation and shared the hopes and
idealism of the Trumbulls, would be a harrowing task. To under-
3a. WHrr, LIFE OF TRUMUL (1913).
4. See TEXBROEK, op. cit. supra note 3, c. 9-12; FLACK, Op. Cit. supra note 3, c. 1;
Graham, Our "Declaratory" Fourteenth Amendment, to he published.
5. 16 'Vall. 36,"'71 (U. S. 1873).
6. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 (1896) ; two excellent recent critiques are
Hyman, Segregation and the Fourteenth Amendment, 4 VAND. L. REv. 555 (1951);
Pamsmeir, The Fourteenth Amendment and the "Separate But Equal" Doctrine, 50
MICH. L. R . 203 (1951).
7. For "revisionist" views and bibliographies, see also Beale, On Rewriting Recon-
struction History, 45 A.m. HIST. REv. 807 (1940); Williams, An Analysis of Some
Reconstruction Attitudes, 12 JL. OF SOUTHERN HIsT. 469 (1946) ; Bucm, THE ROAD TO
REuxiox, 1865-1900 (1937); RANDALL, THE CIVIL ,VAa AND REcONsTRucrioN (1937);
COULTER, THE SOUTH DURING RECONSTRUCTION (1947); Duaors, BAitc REcoNsTRuc-
TION (1935); BEALE, THE CmTcAL YEA (1930). An indispensible bibliographic aid
on the legal side of civil rights history is POLITICAL AND CnIIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED
STATES (Emerson and Haber, eds. 1952).
8. (1944).
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take it now, when every headline is a reminder of farflung Amer-
ican interests, and of the necessity for moral leadership in a world
only one-third of whose population is white, would be a sobering,
depressing experience for any citizen.
The initial reaction, after incredulity, at national frustration
and failures of this magnitude, is anger, and search for historic
villains or scapegoats. Thaddeus Stevens and Charles Sumner,
the leading Ultra-Radicals and Vindictives; Andrew Johnson, the
vain, pugnacious little President, as courageous (and occasionally
as right) as he was inept, have served in countless histories and
speeches in this regard. So have innumerable lesser, general fry-
"Abolitionist fanatics," "Black Republicans," "Grant Stal-
warts," "Carpetbaggers," "Scalawags" and the rest. And on
the other side, their opposites, the "unrepentent Rebels,'Traitors
and Secesh" that figured in stump speeches for fifty years.
Our generation fortunately has outgrown such history. The
Civil War and Reconstruction now are uniformly viewed as fail-
ures of statesmanship and of resource on both sides. Fanaticism
was no monoply of abolitionists. Slavery was not a "positive
good;" nor its abolition "evil," nor protection of freedmen's
rights "unconstitutional and unnecessary." On the other hand,
neither were immediate Negro suffrage and military government
the panaceas naive and designing men pretended. Negation and
polarized programs at length brought both sides to near disaster.
Reunion was largely at the expense of the Negro Race.
9
Constitutional history-barely has begun to benefit from this
revisionism. Indeed, the whole subject has fallen on evil days.
Once a favored form of American history, today it is the most
neglected. McLaughlin's volume,1 published in 1935, is still the
latest general coverage as such. Constitutional Law, of course
has split off as a discipline in its own right-abstruse, technical,
increasingly viewed and taught merely as a system of rules with
little regard for political and social context.
11 The residue ob-
9. This view is taken now in nearly all modem discussions, but corrective judicial
interpretation still lags. For brilliant revisionary studies of the so-called "redemptionist"
movement, see WOODwARD, THE ORIGINS OF THE NxV SOUTH (1951); and for the
politics of the Reconstruction settlement of 1877, the same author's, REUNION AND
REAcTiON (1951).
10. McLAUGHLIN, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1935);
KELY AND HARBISON, THE AmRIcAN CoNSTituTION; ITs ORIGINS AND DEVE.OPMENT
(1948) and SWISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPm:ENT (1943) are admirable
academic works; the writer is here speaking of the decline of the subject in the popular
sense. Professor Crosskey's tour de force, cited supra note 3, promises to quicken popular
interest in the subject.
11. For exploration of some of the consequences, see Graham, Procedure to Sub-
stance-Extra-Judicial Rise of Due Process, 1830-1860, 40 Cuim. L. Rxv. 483 (1953).
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viously is difficult to manage. Even monographic treatments
and judicial biographies have grown fewer. A widening gap is
thus created, not only by differential rates of institutional growth,
but by shifts of research interest as well.
An undesired consequence is that Americans generally are
losing fouch with a vital part of their past-and are doing so
despite tremendous emphasis, in colleges and secondary schools, on
American history and government. Constitutional democraey
rests, in the long run, on popular understanding of its bases and
operations. It is evident, therefore, that this growing neglect of
constitutional history, and our tendency to build up arrearages of
research and understanding, are by no means healthy signs.
In so far as popular-and even professional-understanding
is concerned, one finds proof of this in the present status of the
Fourteenth Amendment itself. That Amendment, as mystified
Van Winkle12 reminded us, has been a part of our Constitution
12. Once briefed, however, Van Winkle proved sharp indeed. The following
fragment, found among his papers with the abbreviated title, "Reargt. School Seg.
Cases?," suggests that he even for a time toyed with the notion of appearing anlicus
curiae opposite his eminent fellow-New Yorker, John W. Davis, Counsel for the Stateof South Carolina, and dean of the American corporate bar. From the references to
Roscoe Conkling's argument it is plain the old libertarian took a sardonic layman's view
of some matters not heretofore lightly treated either by judges or historians:
"Were we called upon to appear before your Honors in the role of counsel for
corporations seeking protection as persons under Section One, challenging what even
corporations apparently at times can feel to be 'invidious and discriminating legislation,'
we should be obliged to make an embarrassing admission. We should have to admit
that not one word ever has been found, either in the speeches of the framers, the debates
of the 39th Congress, or the proceedings of the ratifying legislatures, which expressly
declares, or otherwise clearly indicates, that even one individual, of all that extensive
group, then 'contemplated or understood' corporate 'persons' to be embraced within theprotection of Section One. An impenetrable barrier of silence-absolute and inscrutable-
prevails here. To maintain the corporate proposition, therefore, we perhaps should be
obliged to rest our case, as did that famous advocate-and upstate New Yorker, Roscoe
Conkling, when he appeared before this Court in 1882, wholly upon circumstantial
grounds. We might be obliged to use, as was he, the Journal of the Joint Committee ofFifteen that drafted the Amendment,-and perhaps also some inference and conjecture
[See Graham, The 'Conspiracy Theory' of the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 YALE L. J.
371, 375-385 (1938)] to show that corporations had come within the purview of the
framers. We might well despair of that task-as might even our distinguished adver-
sary, Mr. Davis himself, at this date. [See Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303
U. S. 77, 83 (1938) ; Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U. S. 562, 576-581 (1949).]
"But we all know that this corporate point, happily, has been foreclosed now for
nearly 67 years. Not merely foreclosed, but substantially waived: In 1886, Conkling
and his associate counsel were again prepared to make their extremely circumstantial
argument, in a second series of Railroad Tax Cases involving the issues earlier left
undecided when the first series had been withdrawn. At the outset of this second series
of arguments, Chief Justice Waite announced from the bench, in the only statement
ever made by the full Court in deciding this crucial matter: 'The court does not wish
to hear argument on the question whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution, which forbids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction theequal protection of the laws, applies to these Corporations. We are all of the opinion
that it does.
Footnote continued on following page
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eighty-five years. That it was adopted and ratified to remove all
doubt about national power to protect the freedmen and to assure
progressive removal of the discriminations, denials and abridg-
ments in rights that had been a part of the slave system is gen-
erally conceded. Such has been the affirmed judicial view since
1873.13 In 1908, moreover, Flack published his monograph, The
Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, summarizing the debates
in Congress and in the ratifying legislatures. Numerous works
have recovered much of the ground since.11  All agree regarding
the racial motivation of the Amendment. In the meantime, how-
ever, certain collateral and secondary problems have become
points of controversy. Two in particular have persisted at the
judicial level: One, what framers and ratifiers contemplated or
Footnote continued from preceding page
"We today are beset by no difficulties or handicaps of evidence in these School Cases.
The Congressional debates are almost too voluminous ...
"We will show, as predecessor counsel and historians have shown many times the
past 85 years, that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to be a bulwark for the
rights of the Negro race; that it was designed to prohibit all public discriminations
based upon race and color alone: that it was designed to wipe out what the Civil War
generation rightly called the 'badges and indicia' of slavery, its hateful 'vestiges and
appendages. School Segregation, we submit, comes in this category.
"On these points, happily, our evidence is abundant; and the authorities are vir-
tually unanimous. The ante-bellum history, the Congressional debates, the researches
and writings of Flack, Fairman, Frank, Graham, Boudin, tenBroeck, and Crosskey,
whatever their different emphases, and whatever the doubts or disagreements on
secondary details, clearly and unanimously support our position:'
The notes break off abruptly at this point. Close reading shows of course that
although militantly anti-separate-but-equal, the orientation here is not anti-corporate.
As some of his other memoranda made clear, Van Winkle felt that "'Due process' and'equal protection', not 'person', are the key words." "Query: Aren't they ample enough
for anybody?" To renege on corporate personality at this date was by his view "Pretty
close to infanticide. . . . Remorse inevitable, then perhaps another brood-or at least
another brood of fictions." See the pre-Civil War history of the diversity of citizenship
clause, and McGovney thereon, A Supreme Court Fiction, 56 HARv. L. REv. 853 (1943).
Finally, he concluded with the observation, "Calvinists haven't always thought so
highly of legislatures, or had such occasion to, as people 1932-195?"
Elsewhere, Van Winkle gave hearty endorsement of the punched card project,
proudly noting that IBM had made itself right at home in his native Catskills. The
writer wishes to express his indebtedness to Dr. Van Winkle for numerous insights
and suggestions.
13. The calamitous effects of a caste system which really was established and
constitutionally condoned a full generation after Reconstruction (see WooDWAPD, op. cit
supra note 9, at 209-212 and Graham, supra note 4) have too long obscured this fact, as
has the lush economic use made of the Amendmen. Yet Justice Miller's majority opinion
in the Slaughter-House Cases, supra note 5 and Justice Bradley's majority opinion in the
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3 (1883) both are strong expositions of the Negro Race
motivation of the Amendment. It often is overlooked in this regard that Justice Bradley
himself nominally accepted the "badges and incidents" thesis of Trumbull and Harlan.
See also the strong Negro Race statements in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, 21 (1948):
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60, 76-77 (1917) ; Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S.
303, 306-7 (1880). Our fears and sextants, not stars, have thrown us off course. Cor-
rective action is a simple matter.
14. See note 3 mtPra.
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understood with regard to corporate persons ;", the other, whether
Section One was intended to incorporate the Bill of Rights to the
extent of making all the first eight Amendments binding upon the
States." Significantly, both of these controversies resulted in
combing and recomblug of debates for evidence to support two
sets of diametrically opposed positions.17 Research of this type
necessarily has been piecemeal, with attention focused on the one
narrow point, and to the neglect or subordination of larger pur-
poses.
The upshot is that after nearly a half-century of research and
debate judges and historians are still unagreed about two funda-
mental questions concerning the Amendment's purposes. Dis-
mayed or not, the Court meantime, by its first two questions in
the School cases,18 directed that another minute search be made-
on another narrow point-and again in a manner that tends to
lose sight of the Amendment's broader objectives.
Furthermore, framer-intent, as a criterion in these matters,
obviously has had a distinctly hit-and-miss application. So much
so, indeed, that one wonders whether, in asking Negro counsel to
search for and present evidence of framer-intent on this specific
issue of school segregation the Court remembered that no such
request ever had been made-or ever could have been made-
with regard to countless matters and fields over which it previously
had extended the Amendment's protection. Absolutely nothing,
for example, is found in the debates on whether sound trucks 0 or
picketing 0 are to be regarded as constitutionally privileged free
speech. There is nothing on "reasonable" rates of return for
public service companies.2' In fact, no one ever has found a single
word in the main debates suggesting that framers and ratifiers
"contemplated or understood" corporations to be "persons" un-
der the due process and equal protection clauses. Yet this last,
most vital point was conceded by the Court, without formal
15. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v. Johnson, 303 U. S. 77, 83 (1938);
Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U. S. 562, 576 (1949).
16. Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46 (1947).
17. On the corporate personality issue, see Graham, Conspiracy Theory of theFourteenth Amendmenf, 47 Y.r. L J. 371 (1938), 48 YArE L. J. 171 (1938); and asan example of the diverse interpretations drawn therefrom, see HAcKER, THE TRIUmPH
OF A.EmRCAN CAPITALIsm 388-392 (1940), and FAIRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THESUPRME CoUrr 187-189 (1939). On the incorporation of the Bill of Rights problem,
see Justice Black's historical appendix, Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 68, 92-123(1947) and Fairman, supra note 3, and the companion article by Morrison, Does the
Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? 2 SrAx. L REv. 140 (1949).
18. See notes 1 and 2 supra.
19. Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948). Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77 (1949).
See also Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U. S. 106 (1949).
20. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940).
21. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466 (1897).
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opinion, and with the matter of framer-intent substantially
waived, exactly 67 years ago !22
On the other hand, the evidence in the debates is overwhelming
that racial discrimination very broadly conceived was the framers'
target.23 Added constitutional power thus was tapped for this
very reason and an attempt at a minute (or even broad) taxonomy
of discriminations was understandably avoided.24 As Bingham put
it, "You do not prohibit murder in the Constitution; you guarantee
life in the Constitution."' 25 And so, it was with "liberty" and
"protection," and above all, equal protection."
No doubt these are matters to which the Justices are now de-
voting serious consideration. It is appropriate therefore. before
turning to the central difficulty that bedevilled draftmanship and
early interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment-to say noth-
ing of our own ability to perceive and fully comprehend the
framers' purposes-to call attention to one vital objection to this
whole prevailing approach. Manifestly, the trend at both the
judicial and historical levels has been toward a narrow anti-
quarianism. Facts are being determined and treated in isolation,
one at a time, and virtually out of their contexts. Where we
should now be synthesizing our knowledge of the Fourteenth
Amendment, we go on fragmentizing it, pulverizing it, compart-
mentalizing it. This obviously can get us nowhere. The orbits of
inquiry are too restricted; the purposes too narrow, too discon-
nected. Results naturally are indecisive; and can only be increas-
ingly so. Law office history and search-and re-search!-of
this type could go on forever to no clear result-could become as
sterile and negative as medieval scholasticism. Indeed, "con-
stitutional scholasticism" would seem an excellent name for the
trend. For even if applied evenhandedly this method is open to
serious objection. It tends to make 1866 the decisive date in
American history; it gives rise to innumerable searches of records
for guidance that simply isn't there; it leads to obscurantism and
conjecture; almost inevitably it transforms the humble "argument
from silence" into both a murderous and a suicidal weapon.26
22. Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Ry. Co., 118 U. S. 394, 396 (1886)
(equal protection clause) ; Minneapolis and St. L. Ry. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 26,
28 (1889) (due process clause).
23. See TNDr.oa, op. cit. supra note 3; Graham, Early Antislavery Backgrounds
of the Fourteenth Amendment, [1950] Wis. L. Rnv. 479 and 610; Frank and Munro,
cited supra note 3; also Graham, supra note 4.
24. Graham, supra note 4.
25. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 432 (1866).
26. A national conference, or an hour of professional soul-searching on "The Use
and Misuse of the Argument from Silence" might have beneficial results. Fifteen years
Footnote continued on following page
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
If we are interested in arriving at the purpose and meaningof our Fourteenth Amendment, in so far as that meaning can be
determined from what was said by those who sponsored and rati-fied it, 1866-68, there is a simple and decisive way of doing so. The
debates are extensive, but not unlimited; they simply call for
systematic analysis and for complete, detailed tabulation of find-ings rather than for mere reading, summary, and selective quota-
tion. Above all, the speakers' positions and remarks ought to be
correlated with various background data, and the whole coded andanalyzed with reference to all significant points and relation-
ships.2 7
The modern, efficient way to do this is by coordinate orpunched card analysis. If the eyesight and energy expended inthe course of the reading and searches on each successive narrow
point that has arisen had been directed along these lines, we todayshould have a complete permanent index covering every major
issue and problem included in the debates, and one that would
point up significant interrelationships, not only of the framers'
ideas and objectives, but of the influences and affiliations respon-
sible for them. With the Fourteenth Amendment today the con-
stitutional cornerstone of civil liberties in the States, 28 and withhundreds of thousands of dollars to be expended in the next fewyears by the Fund for the Republic,2 9 on studies of their definition
and enforcement, it would seem that this long overdue project
must presently be undertaken.
It is interesting to note in this respect that exploration of
antislavery backgrounds 0 meanwhile has begun to afford a clearerpicture of what framers of the Fourteenth Amendment were
driving at, and why they employed the phraseology they did. How
the eaual protection-due process-Drivilezes-immunities trilogy
crystallized from primitive natural rights theories and from
earlier constitutional forms; how, during the long antislavery
crusade, it became a form of shorthand for, and spearhead of, theFederal Bill of Rights; how at last in 1866 it won full-fledged con-
Footnote continued from preceding page
ago in 47 YArx L. J. 386-387 the writer probed this problem and won numerous con-verts. Backsliding however has been frequent, and at times the writer himself has beensorely tempted. Resolution in these matters would be effectively aided by a truly com-prehensive, multi-dimensional analysis of the debates.27. The writer has prepared a draft schedule of a number of points and issueswhich in his judgment should be covered in such an analysis. He will welcome theviews -nd suggestions of others on these matters.28. See works cited note 3 supra; REPPY, CiviL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATEs 103ff. (1951) and especially c. VI "Group Discrimination and the Constitution."
29. Newsweek, June 8, 1953, p. 60, col. 1.30. See especially Graham, supra note 23, and iENBRoEx, op. cit. spra note 3.
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stitutional status as a kind of universal common denominator, is
a thrilling story that need not be repeated here. The heart of it is
that the framers' three-clause system represented a thirty-year
winnowing and synthesis of the antislavery, anti-race discrimina-
tion argument. Religious, ethical, historical appeals constituted
its original forms. At the outset, the Lockean philosophy of ante-
cedant and inalienable rights (which colonial leaders had em-
ployed so effectively in the Revolution) simply had been given a
new twist. Americans, it was argued, had to live up to their Decla-
ration. "All men" had to mean all men; "Governments . . . in-
stituted to secure these rights" of "life, liberty and the pursuit
of happiness"; and governments "deriving their just powers
from the consent of the governed" had to bestow protection, and
to bestow it equally, irrespective of race and color, or the "self-
evident truths" became self-evident mockery.
Thus, from the very beginning the antislavery movement was
fundamentally a quest for protection of the laws. Slavery was
ethically repugnant, not simply because it chattelized man, but be-
cause it repudiated the very purpose of government and arbi-
trarily denied to some humans its protections solely on the basis
of skin color.
This double-headed concept and standard of equal protec-
tion of the laws, ethically derived from Lockean theory, from the
Declaration and from the comity clauses of the Articles of Con-
federation and Constitution, as well as from the State and Fed-
eral Bills of Rights, was already well synthesized by the 1830s."'
It was spelled out fully and given its most persuasive statement
in two of the early documents of the organized antislavery move-
ment: first, in the Ellsworth-Goddard argument in the Crandall
Case,2 wherein local Black Laws in Connecticut denying out-of-
state Negro children rights of education were successfully .chal-
lenged; then in repeated attacks by the newly-formed Ohio Anti-
slavery Society on similar Ohio laws which denied free Negroes
rights of residence, livelihood, court testimony and education.3 3 In
both of these instances strong use was made of the federal comity
clause, and of a nascent concept of a "general" or paramount
"American" or "national" citizenship. In the Ohio attacks,
moreover, the due course of law clause of the State Constitution
also was employed. Thus by 1835 all three elements of our
modern Fourteenth Amendment trinity are found linked together
31. Graham, spra note 23 passim.
32. 10 Conn. 339, 341-348 (1834) ; see Graham supra note 23, at 498-506, especially
. I 65 33. Id. at 494-498.
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and used actively against racial discrimination and in behalf of
the rights of the free Negroes of the North.8'
This, however, is barely half the story. The most fascinating
part of it is how this primitive constitutional argument got broad-
cast 5 over the land-reiterated, expanded, winnowed, and clarified
-until by 1866 it served the Civil War generation as a form of
constitutional shorthand-an ethico-legal common denominator de-
signed to accomplish within, the Constitution and through the
courts, precisely what, for the past thirty years, it had accomplish-
ed as a "higher law", above the Constitution, and in the minds ofthose who had crusaded so long against slavery and against racial
discrimination. One can sense immediately the hazards and the
obstacles to this sort of constitutional transsubstantiation, and
these are being treated at length in another article.30  The point
here is that this powerful "antislavery impulse" radiated out-
ward from central and western New York in the early and mid-
thirties.3 7 It was a part of a "revival of religion" led by Charles
G. Finney, an able lawyer turned evangelist, and by Theodore
Weld, then still a student at Oneida Institute and ultimately one of
the most remarkable, influential men of his generation. Backed
by New York nhilanthroiiists who in 1833 organized the American
Antislavery Society, and aided by dedicated groups of students
attracted by his leadership and personality, Weld and his
"Oneidas" moved westward. During the mid- and late-thirties
they converted thousands in Ohio, west Pennsylvania and New
York to their "benevolent reforms "-temperance, women's and
Negroes' rights, and above all, to "immediate emancipation"-
1. e., emancipation immediately begun. By means of revivals,
pamphlets, newspapers; by "declarations," resolutions, petitions,
they broadcast their ethico-moral-religious-constitutional argu-
ment, abolitionizing whole communities.38
Such success however, soon generated reaction, and reaction
brought about reorientation.3 9 Denied access to the Southern and
border States; maligned and attacked as subversives and sedition-
34. It is impossible to overstress the fact that the antislavery movement merelywas the largest part of an anti-race discrimination movement. The discriminationsagainst free Negroes, and those against Indians for example, were as vigorously attackedas slavery, and for the same reason: race and color were arbitrary, irrational basesfor distinctions in men's rights. This fact obviously has tremendous bearing on thescope and purpose of both the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. Yet our tendency,almost from the first in construing the Amendments has been to think of slavery simplyas chattelization, and to ignore the broader motivations.
35. See note 30 supra.
36. Graham, sura note 4.
37. See BANES, THE Awxsr~vEzy IMPULSE (1933).
38. Ibid.; also DUMOND, THE AxTiSLAVERY ORIGINs oF THE CrVL WAR (1938).
39. Ibid.; BAjmns, op. cit. supra note 37.
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ists by proslave forces fearful both of emancipation, and of slave
instkrrections, obliged to defend even their own rights to discuss
and to proselytize, the American Antislavery Society leaders and
their movement soon were left with no alternative but political
action. This alternative they at first accepted reluctantly, then ex-
ploited brilliantly. First in the Liberty Party of 1840-44,40 then in
the Free Soil Party of 1848,"' and the Free Democracy of 1852,2
leaders like Salmon P. Chase43-original converts of the -Weld
group-wrote into their platforms and speeches and resolutions
these very concepts of protection and of equal protection derived
from the Declaration of Independence and guaranteed by the para-
mount national citizenship of the comity clause and by state and
federal due process. Such arguments of course were now no
longer limited merely to proving the expediency and justice of
abolition, but were turned azainst slavery and all its works. At
length, after repeal of the Missouri Compromise by the Kansas-
Nebraska Act, the new Republican Party, taking its stand now
against extension of slavery, appropriated in toto and-repeated
in its own platforms and in countless speeches of its members
and leaders, 1854-60 41 this identical rhetoric and theory. Old texts
thus were refurbished and given rebirth. So, at long last, the
rejected stones came to stand at the head of the corner.
Nothing better ties all these developments together. or better
reveals their true character and significance, than a speech made
in the House in 1859 by John A. Bingham.45 Bingham of course
was the Ohio representative who just seven years later was des-
tined to draft Sections One and Five of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. At this date he represented the 21st District which had
been thoroughly abolitionized by the antislavery evangelists in
1835-37 while he himself was attending Franklin College near
Cadiz. Franklin then had been second only to Oberlin as an anti-
slavery stronghold. Indeed, we find records of petitions and reso-
lutions of the Cadiz antislavery societies couched in the very
phraseology for which Bingham, now in 1859, and later, manifests
his preference. Moreover, his speech is made against a pr6vision
40. The relevant planks are quoted in TENBROEK, OP. cit. supna note 3, at 119-121;
see also STANWOOD, HISTORY OF THE P EsiNwcY 218 (1904).
41. Id. at 240.
42. Id. at 253-254.
43. See HAHI, SALMON P. CHASE 51-52 (1899). A thorough study of Chase's
role in the antislavery movement would itself do much to set the War Amendments in
clearer perspective.
44. See STANwOOD, op. cit. supra note 40, at 271-272, 291-294 for the due process
and other antislavery constitutional theory in the Republican Platforms of 1856 and 1860.
Note Planks 2, 8. and 14 of 1860.
45. See Dicr. AM. Bios.; BRExNAN, Biom. ENCycL.. . . OF OHIo 312 (1880);
Graham, 4upra note 23 at 623, 655, n. 149, 150, 255.
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in the Oregon Constitution of 18574' which was almost a repetition
of the hateful Ohio Black laws: "No free Negro or mulatto not
residing in the State at the time of the adoption of this Constitu-
tion, shall ever come, reside or be within this State, or hold any
real estate, or make any contract or maintain any suit therein
Bingham first contended 47 that these provisions violated the
Federal comitv clause and the rights of "citizens of the United
States." "Who are citizens of the United States? They are
those, and those only, who owe allegience to the Government of
the United States . . . [They are] all free persons born or domi-
ciled within the jurisdiction of the United States, and aliens
naturalized under the laws of Congress."
I invite attention to the significant fact that natural or in-
herent rights, which belong to all men, irrespective of all conven-
tional regulations, are by this Constitution guaranteed by the
broad and comprehensive word "person," as contradistinguished
from the limited term citizen-as in the fifth article of amend-
ments, guarding those sacred rights which are as universal and
indestructible as the human race, that "no person shall be de-
prived of life, liberty, or property, but by due process of law, nor
shall private property be taken without just compensation." And
this guarantee applies to all citizens within the United States.
[Italics supplied.]
Against infringement of "these wise and beneficent guar-
antees of political rights to the citizens of the United States as
such, and of natural rights to, all persons, whether citizens or
strangers," stood the supremacy clause.
There, sir, is the limitation upon State sovereignty- simple,
clear, and strong. No State may rightfully, by Constitution or
statute law, impair any of these guaranteed rights either politi-
cal or natural. They may not righifully or lawfully declare that
the strong citizens may deprive the weak citizens of their rights,
natural or political . .
This provision [excluding free Negroes and mulattoes] seems
to me . . injustice and oppression incarnate. This provi-
sion, sir, excludes from the State of Oregon eight hundred thou-
sand of the native born citizens of the other States, who are,
therefore, citizens of the United States. I grant you that a
State may restrict the exercise of the elective franchise to cer-
tain classes of citizens of the United States, to the exclusion of
others; but I deny that any State may exclude a law-abiding
46. Art. I, § 35.
47. ConG. GLoBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 981-985 (1859).
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citizen of the United States from coming within its territory,
or abiding therein, or acquiring and enjoying property therein,
or from the enjoyment therein of the "privileges and immuni-
ties" of a citizen of the United States. What says the Consti-
tation:
"The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges
and immunities of citizens in the several States.' Art. 4,
Section 2.
Here is no qualification . . . The citizens of each State,
all the citizens of each State, being citizens of the United States,
shall be entitled to "all privileges and immunities of citizens of
the several States." Not to the rights and immunities of the
several States; not to those constitutional rights and immunities
which result exclusively from State authority or State legisla-
tion; but to "all privileges and immunities" of citizens of the
United States in the several States. There is an ellipsis in the
language employed in the Constitution, but its meaning is self-
evident, that it is "the privileges and immunities of citizens of
the United States" that it guarantees .
[S]ir, I maintain that the persons thus excluded from the
State by this section of the Oregon Constitution, are citizens by
birth of the several States, and therefore are citizens of the
United States, and as such are entitled to all the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States, amongst which are
the rights of life and liberty and property, and their due protec-
tion in the enjoyment thereof by law; .
Who, sir, are citizens of the United States? First, all free
persons born and domiciled within the United States-not all
free white persons, but all free persons. You will search in
vain, in the Constitution of the United States, for that word
white; it is not there. You will look in vain for it in that first
form of National Government-the Articles of'Confederation;
it is not there. The omission of this word-this phrase of caste
-from our national charter, was not accidental, but intentional.
This Government rests upon the absolute equality of natural
rights amongst men.
Who, ... will be bold enough to deny that all persons are
equally entitled to the enjoyment of the rights of life and liberty
and property, and that no one should be deprived of life or lb-
erty, but as punishment for crime; nor of his property, against
his consent and without due compensation? .
The equality of all to the right to live; to the right to kcnow;
to argue and to utter, according to conscience; to work, and
enjoy the product of their toil, is the rock on which that Consti-
tution rests-- . . The charm of that Constitution lies in
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the great democratic idea which it embodies, that all men, before
the law, are equal in respect to those rights of person which God
gives, and no man or State may rightfully take away, except as
a forfeiture for crime. Before your Constitution, sir, as it is,
as I trust it ever will be, all men are sacred, whether white or
black. . . [Italics supplied throughout.]
Surely, this speech alone is enough to put Sections One and
Five in clearer perspective. All the clauses and concepts that
Bingham and the Joint Committee were to employ seven years
later are employed here. Protection and equal protection, duo
process of law, and a paramount national citizenship attained by
removing the "ellipsis" from the comity clause, are all expressly
relied on. They are relied on, moreover, to combat the type of
racial classification, and racial discrimination, that were incidents
of slavery, and which had been attacked by these forms repeatedly
in the quarter century since their use in the Crandall arguments
and in the Ohio Antislavery Society report on the state's Black
Laws. (Indeed, use of the comity clause in this manner extended
back to similar use in the debates over Missouri's admission to
the Union, 1819-21,11 and even to use, in 1778, of the comity clause
of the still-unratified Articles of Confederation.) 49 It is interest-
ing to note, furthermore, that although this speech was made
two years after the Dred Scott decision, Bingham not only does
not follow that decision, he does not even acknowledge or mention
it; he simply disavows any color line as a basis for citizenship of
the United States; he regards Milton's rights of communication
and conscience, including the right to know-to education--as one
of the great fundamental natural "rights of person which God
gives and no man or state may rifhtfully take away," and which
hence are "embodied," also, within, and secured by, "the great
democratic idea that all men before the law are equal." In short,
the concept and guarantee of the equal protection of the laws is
already "embodied" in the Federal Constitution of 1859, not-
withstanding the Dred Scott decision; this same concept, more-
over, embraces "the equality of all . . . to the right to know";
and above all, there is no color line even in the Constitution of
1859!
It is the bearing and significance of this inherent and inalien-
able rights argument-("fundamental rights of person which God
gives and no man or state may rightfully take away")-that calls
for consideration. Patently, what we are witnessing in this speech
of Bingham's-so typical of thousands in the two decades 1819-
48. See McLAUGHLIN, Op. cit. supra note 10, c. 29; BURGESs, THE MIDDLE PERioD,
1817-58 c. 4 (1897).
49. Graham, =spra note 23 at 616, n. 103.
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66o--is a gradual constitutionalization of an ethico-moral argu-
ment or ideal. Slavery-with its theories of racial damnation,
racial inferiority and racial discrimination-was inherently re-
pugnant to the American Creed and the Christian ethic. This fact
was being rapidly and increasingly sensed. As men sensed it,
they fit it into the only political theory they knew: Governments
existed, not to give, but to protect human rights; allegiance and
protection were reciprocal-i. e., ought to be reciprocal; rights and
duties were correlative-i. e., had to be correlative if Americans
ever were to live with their consciences and to justify their de-
clared political faith."'
Let us note well this point, for it is precisely the problem we
still are faced with, and it is one of the keys to understanding the
Fourteenth Amendment: Ethical and religious opinions were here
molding and remolding constitutional doctrine. Moral premises
were being translated into legal and constitutional premises -i. e.,
enforceable rights. This was being done by a "due processing"
and an "equial protecting" of the Law of Nature. It was going on,
as yet, largely in the public, rather than in the judicial mind, but
let us not condemn it on that account. (Paraphrasing the familiar:
"Is not every human a judge?") What these men were doing was
using the sanctions of a "higher'--i. e., ethico-moral law-to de-
feat and override the claims of an arbitrary, barbarous, positive
law. Now in doing this they of course got themselves into some
logical and semantic difficulties. Bootstrap arguments often tend
-or end- so! Yet without bootstrap arguments to give scope to
men's conscience and idealism, and to their sense of justice or in-
justice, surely the law would have remained poor and barbarous
indeed.
52
It is strange and unfortunate so little attention has been paid
to this phase of the antislavery conflict. It perhaps is the classic
example of moral and ethical revision of the law and of creative
50. The report and pamphlet documentation of the American Antislavery Society
crusade alone is huge; add to it items broadcasting the constitutional argument, the
repetition by speeches, petitions, resolutions, editorials, literary society debates, etc.,
over a period of two generations, throughout all the non-slave States, and one perceives
that the three-clause system of Section One was no spontaneous or fortuitous creation.
51. See Graham, supra note 23 at 614-617, 638-643 for characteristic statements and
evidence showing the evolution of this ethical interpretation of American origins anddestiny.52. For interesting recent discussions of the relations of the "is" and "ought" in
law, cf. FULLER, THE LAW QUEsT OF ITSELF (1940) ; CAHN, THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE
(1949); STONE, PROVINCE AND FUNcTION OF LAW (1946) c. VIII "Natural. Law,"
especially pp. 227-238; COHEN, ETHICAL SYSTEMS AND LEGAL ID.LS (1933). PAT-
TERSON, JURISPRUDENCE: MEN AND IDEAS OF THE LAW 230-243 (1953) has a useful
hornbook discussion and bibliography of the "Principles of Morality as Sources" of
law. See also, id. at 358-375, §§ 4.15-4.17 on "Natural Law."
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popular jurisprudence and constitution makingli3-at least in the
nineteenth century. "Hearthstone opinions"' in this process ob-
viously were far more vital and determinative than judicial opin-
ions.' Constitutional Law here was growing at the base rather
than at the top. The change in the ethos determined the change
in the leges, and the continuous interactions run to the heart of
both history and politics. Furthermore, our own generation is
now bedevilled by similar problems, and is nervously groping to-
ward affirmative re-declarations of human rights with a view to-
ward eventual sanctions at the international level. It would seem
very much worthwhile, therefore, to re-examine this experience
and learn from it all we can.
Despite this high relevance, our attitude toward those re-
sponsible for the Civil War changes has tended toward indiffer-
ence and hyper-criticism. In part, this is a natural result of the
Reconstruction debacle-(though certainly the worst failures of
that period arose not from constitutional idealism, but from the
lack or the loss of it). Hence, we still are more inclined to criticize
the framers' "miserable draftsmanship", 6 or speculate on their
possible cunning, or even ulterior purposes, 7 than to consider
exactly what it was they had to contend with. Another factor un-
doubtedly has been that natural rights-higher law thinking is no
53. A great deal has been written of the Higher Law and Natural Law content
of American constitutional decisions-cf. the familiar of Corwin, Haines, Wright, Grant,
and Commager-but the fascinating and elusive relations between the popular matrix
and the judicial impress are almost untouched. See however, POUND, THE FOR.,tATrWv
EA oF A~mc& LAW 16 (1938) ; and note 51 supra.
54. This happy phrase was discovered in a speech made by Rep. James F. Wilson
during debates on the Thirteenth Amendment. The tenacious hold and blight of
slavery, he said, extended "From hearthstone opinions to decisions of the Supreme Court
of the United States . . ." ConG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1201 (1864).
55. On the role of antislavery "hearthstone opinions" in expanding due process,
see Graham, Procedure to Substance, Extra Judicial Rise of Due Process, 1830-1860,
40 CALIr. L. REV. 483 (1953).
56. For one example among many, see Grant, The Natural Law Background
of Due Process, 31 CoL. L. REv. 56, 66 (1931) ; or witness almost any modern law
students' class discussion. Such criticism originated in the widening gap between
known intent and judicial interpretation after the Slaughter-House decision; it has
persisted and increased in recent years as our capacity to appreciate the formerly-
powerful hold of natural law theories has inevitably declined.
A related astigmatism is the view, well expressed by Mort, DuE PaocEss or LAw
165 (1926), ". . . there seems to have been a subconscious attempt on the part of the
framers and ratiflers of the Fourteenth Amendment to make it as vague as possible."
The writer submits that this is hindsight with a vengeance. Possibly the shift from
positive to negative form-i. e. moving the phrase "Congress shall have power . . ."
from Section One to Section Five was dictated in part by fancied cleverness, but the
antislavery backgrounds, wholly ignored by Flack and only recently rediscovered, cer-
tainly explain the rest of the draft, and incidentally expose our own long-fallacious
approach to the Amendment (i. e. the mistaken older view that it was simply a for-
tuitous combination of restraint clauses plus a redundant grant of power to enforce
rights already entrusted to the judiciary).
57. Cf. the perennial fascinations of the "Conspiracy Theory"; see note 3 supra,
the articles of Graham, Boudin, McLaughlin, and references therein cited.
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longer in vogue today."8 Indeed, it is a red flag to a law school-
drilled generation. Admittedly, old imprecisions and manifest
preferences for clumsy "universals'"'" in place of today's sharp
analysis have been further barriers to interest and understanding.
All we need to do, however, to purge ourselves of this be-
mused superciliousness toward those responsible for the CivilWar
constitutional changes is to consider for a moment exactly what
these men had been up against. One perceives immediately that
they had had to conte-nd with one of the most difficult and confus-
ing problems in politics and jurisprudence-the problem of the
"irresolvable" conflict between the moral and the positive law-
the political-legal equivalent of the scholastics' irresistable force
and immovable body! In the extreme form and terms, such a
problem obviously is unsolvable, except verbally. Yet in practice
it rarely is so. Solution depends ultimately upon a fact situation,
and hence upon the extent to which the irresistable force does
move the unmovable body-or vice versa. Politics and govern-
ment are essentially accommodation and compromise. It is only
the most fiercely and intensely held moral convictions that ever
approach the uncompromisable, or rise Phoenix-like from repeat-
ed defeats, as did the Abolitionists. Positive law itself has a dual
nature. It is both printed texts and human behaviour. When ir-
reconcilable opinion intervenes as a third force, polarizing the
two, arraying one against the other, we have trouble. Represen-
tative government is a means of minimizing this danger. The slav-
ery conflict marks the one utter failure in American history-the
58. This statement obviously needs some qualification. The rapid decline of
naked natural rights thinking was made possible. and perhaps inevitable, by the Four-
teenth Amendment. No one officially has deplored this development. What we too
often fail to appreciate is that only these thin cloaks of substantive due process and
equal protection conceal and disguise our own nakedness. Our new enthusiasm for
Constitutional positivism, therefore, is at times pretty smug. This was another thing
that irked Van Winkle. "Intellectual prudery", he called it. "What we need now in
this School Segregation business is some 'Mote and beam jurisprudence.' For seventy
years everyone else has benefited by this ambiguity and free-wheeling discretion. Must
only the Negroes continue to be victims of it?"
59. For an interesting use of sweeping Blackstoneian "absolute rights of personal
security, personal liberty and personal property,"- followed by embarrassing attempts
to delimit them by muddled distinctions, see the speech of Rep. James F. Wilson, House
sponsor of the Civil Rights Act -of 1866, CONG. GLoBE, 39th Cong. 1st Sess. 1115-1119
(1866). Wilson was a conscientious and able leader, but the law he had learned out
of Blackstone and Kent as a harness-maker's apprentice from the age of thirteen,
simply was inadequate for the purposes at hand. The writer submits that it is either
snobbery or lack of imagination to conclude from such difficulties that these men had
no clear idea of what they were trying to do. The trouble is simply that our greater
sophistication in the complexities of a federal system tends to distract us from their
perfectly clearcut anti-race discrimination purposes. Nearly any modern law student
Is better equipped than these men were to deal with many phases of such a problem.
But the beginning of wisdom here is to stop judging men and intent by reading history
backward to 1866 and to start reading it forward to that date. The Reconstruction
and post-Reconstruction shambles of the Fourteenth Amendment necessarily are poor
aids for its interpretation.
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unique case where ethico-moral opinions ultimately proved un-
compromisable; or, to speak more accurately, where sectional in-
terests and taboos so rigidified, stratified, and hamstrung the fed-
eral system as to render articulated compromise and reform
impossible.
From the first, of course, both sides regarded the slavery
struggle as one of, by, and for Law. The difficulty was over the
nature and sources of law. Was slavery legal, or was it not? All
hands agreed slavery to be supported in each of the slave States
by a body of statutes and decisions. But that did not satisfy anti-
slavery men. Nor would it have satisfied many of us. Slavery
was wrong: Ethically, morally, outrageously wrong-the wrong-
est, most barbarous, anachronistic institution in the civilized
world.60  Hope originally lay for its peaceful eradiction-for
progressive change and attrition of the positive law through edu-
cation and moral suasion. Christianity and patriotism were both
powerful potential levers and solvents. Their efficacy, however,
presumed and required open channels of discussion and appeal-
appeal to reason and to conscience.
6 1
Now in contrast, consider what actually occurred: cotton
profits and politics, combining with morbid fears of slave insur-
rection, first had introverted, then isolated the South, withdraw-
ing the institution from discussion and criticism, and at length-
in abolitionists' eyes-blasphemously apotheosizing it, declaring
it constitutionally sacred and beyond reach, a "positive good."6 ' -
Such claims were depressing and offensive enough, even when
made solely with reference to slavery in the States. When even-
tually expanded (through repeal of the Missouri Compromise
and by the Dred Scott63 decision) to remove all limits upon slav-
ery in the Territories, they became intolerable. The impasse now
was complete. Slavery, wrong as ever, had been put beyond reach,
made unassailable, impregnable.
Now the point is that the "higher law" always had afforded
the one psychological and doctrinal escape from such an impasse.
It was essentially an ethical draft on the future for the benefit
of the present-an unconscious borrowing from men's ideals to
60. See NEwINs' lucid Chapter 5, "Slavery in a World Setting". 2 THn- E.ERG-
ENCE OF LINCOLN (1950), (also his earlier discussions in Chapters 13-15 in his ORDEAL
OF THE UNION (1947)), for an account and view of the institution on the eve of the
War. Nevins' conclusion merits pondering today (with reference to slavery's vestiges) :
"But the time had come when the country, however reluctantly, must face a plain fact:
if the United States was really to be the last, best hope of mankind, it could not
much longer remain a slaveholding republic." (p. 168).
61. See Dumond, op. cit. supra note 38; NYE, FETmRD FREEnm (1949).
62. See Graham supra note 23, especially pp. 631-638. JENKiNs, PP.osLAvRY
THOUGHT IN THE OLD SOUrTH (1935).
63. 19 How. 393 CU. S. 1856).
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civilize their law and humanize their politics. It was the one
means of reconciling facts and ideals abstractly in the hope of
doing so prospectively. Slavery and race discrimination were un-
constitutional by a "higher law" than the Constitution. Ergo,
the higher law ought to become the Constitution. 4
To modern-trained positivists who are inclined to reject this
solution, and to dismiss it as logically "naive and unsound," it is
only fair to issue this challenge: How would we, believing slav-
ery to be morally wrong and ethically indefensible, have attack-
ed it and attempted its overthrow by peaceful means within a
federal system so effectively controlled by pro-slave forces as to
remove the institution from reach and even from constructive
discussionp
How indeed! The silence soon is shattering, and it is shat-
tering simply because the alternatives-for antislavery Whigs
and Democrats particularly-are seen to have been surrender and
condonation on the one hand and resort to this unsatisfactory
higher law-"court of last appeal" on the other. To be candid
about it, then, the higher law was a forensic and educative device;
it was the safety valve that prevented antislavery men from
"blowing their tops." Our generation has been unduly smug
about the matter largely because we have lacked the insight to see
that-fortunately-we have escaped any such intense and irrecon-
cilable positive law-moral law conflict in our own times. (Pro-
hibition of course compares here as a grim joke to high tragedy.
Moreover, it was so susceptible to repeal by mass evasion that
the example itself underscores the differences.) War crimes un-
doubtedly are the nearest modern approach, and indeed a very
significant one: For here again, conscience leavened and inno-
vated the positive law, rather than confess its own impotence.0 5
We can epitomize the matter by saying that ordinarily law
grows interstitially and metabolically. Yet it always is a prod-act
of men's higher faculties and social challenges. When these chal-
lenges are increased to inordinate levels, responses are apt to be
likewise increased. And when the challenge is an ethico-moral chal-
lenge, the law itself ultimately must grow in ethical and moral
content; it will do so creatively if it is unable to do so metaboli-
cally.
64. The research of Professors Dumond, Nye, Jenkins, and Eaton op cit. mpra notes
38, 61, and 62, points up the fact that the fatal blunder in the slavery struggle was the
proscription of persuasion and conversion.
65. See CA H, of. cit. supra note 52, at p. 30, citing R. . Jackson, Trial of War
Criminals, Dept. of State Pub. #2420 (1945) p. 7. ". . . the test of what legally is
crime gives recognition to those things which fundamentally outraged the conscience
of the American People and brought them finally to the conviction that their own
liberty and civilization could not persist in the same world with Nazi Power."
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If this view be taken, it is plain that the trouble throughout
the long struggle over slavery was not so much that there was
this inevitable dualism between moral and civil rights, but that
the necessities of the case demanded that men speak these two
jurisprudential languages in the same breath. That is, forensi-
cally, rights needed to be-and were-interchangeably regarded
as preexistent ideals and as socially implemented and enforceable
privileges or immunities. On the one plane stood the parchment
constitution, given effect by statutes and precedents; on the other,
the subjective instrument which "guaranteed" and "declared"
certain antecedent natural rights. The document thus was alter-
nately shadow and substance-an amendable legal instrument,
and one which, "correctly interpreted" or "declared," required
no amendment.
Now this dualism is inherent and inevitable in natural law
theory. Indeed, Professor Fuller 6 has defined natural law as a
body of thought that tolerates just such confusion for the sake of
its ethical advantages. Hence the dualism persisted. and it reach-
ed its climax in 1866. From our present viewpoint, it would have
helped, surely, if men had perceived then, as clearly as we do to-
day, that when amending the Constitution it is best to eschew de-
claratory theories. To do otherwise, is to put an impossible strain
upon the legal vocabulary; for definitions break down and over-
lap, and communication and straight thinking become almost im-
possible.6 7 The -point is that these men did not, and the Civil War
generation could not eschew such theories, because until after
1865 that generation rarely had known nor used any other! Thus
the antislaveryites' dualism:--or if one wishes to be snobbish
about it, confusion-really was inherent in their necessary job of
"due processing" the Law of Nature and in "protecting" and"equal protecting" the rights of all human beings without regard
for race or color.
It thus can be said that moral and ethical opinions were the
matrix of the War Amendments. The texts and forms themselves,
however, evolved under tremendous counter pressures. These
identifyinz facts alone stamp the three amendments as unique
parts of our Constitution. In geological terms, the three amend-
ments are the "youngest," grandest parts of the document. The
forces that produced them,6 moreover, still are growing today,
both by accretion and through deep seated infernal changes
and pressures. We must remember, too, that these "peaks"
66. See op. cit. sura note 52, at 5.
67. See Graham, sutra note 4.
68. Id. and the works of Graham and tenfroek, cited note 3, supra.
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arose cataclysmically in the Sixties because misguided men so
misjudged their relation to these very facts and forces.
May it not be laid down as axiomatic, even, that the concept
of equal protection of the laws, in racial matters, can no more be
held today to its mid-nineteenth century bounds than due process
of law could be held-perhaps we had better say here, returned-
to that curiously imperfect understanding of it had by King John
and his Barons at Runnymede. Indeed, what happened to old
"per legum terrae," 1215-1953,69 would seem to be the answer
absolute to those who now are offering us their depressing pic-
tures of a cold, sterile, static equal protection-one cast forever
in an 1866 mold ;7 just as what happened to that classic and care-
fully fitted volcanic plug of due process, after Dred Scott,
7' ought
to be warning enough to the self-styled "militants" who again are
bravely trucking up their cement and mixers for another filling
of these same craters. Law and ethics, these men bluntly tell us,
are separate fields. So indeed they are. But spare America the
day again when both together do not determine the meaning of
equal protection of the laws."
Ecual protection of the laws, as we can see, and as Dr. ten-
Broek73 has shown at much greater length, meant first of all the
fulZ protection of the laws. Mind: not "separate but equal,"
69. See Graham, supra note 55 for a bibliography and noting up.
70. There were many reasons why men's understanding of equal protection, as
applied to educational matters, was imperfect in 1866. There were few Negro schools
of any kind at that date. Slave codes for generations had denied education to slaves.
After 1835, in most slave states, it was a crime to teach an, Negro-slave or free-to
read or write. (See HuRD, LAW o. FREEDOM AND BONDAGE (1862)). Negroes were barred
from public schools of the North, and still widely regarded as "racially inferior"
and "incapable of education." Even comparatively enlightened leaders then accepted
segregation in schools. To argue that this means we today are bound by that under-
standing and practice is to transform the mores and laws of slave code days into con-
stitutional sanctions, impossible to be cast off or even moderated.
71. See note 63 supra.
72. It is an unpleasant fact to remember that the constitutional protection ac-
corded the Negro Race -was vitiated and progress in race relations delayed a full two
generations (1897-ca. 1930) because overburdened, poorly prepared, and at times
negligent or incompetent counsel, fighting singlc-handedly and at random a discrinmina-
tlion against an indiiidual client, proved no match for a battery of railroad, steamship
or associated State counsel in the crucial cases 1875-1896. This situation, fortunately
unique in our law, obviously is a powerful argument for reopening many of these issues
and for accelerating revisionism. "Jim Crow" too often gained entrance by some-
thing very close to default or left-handed social favoritism.
73. Op. cit. supra note 3, at 176-180, 222. Both the Freedmen's Bureau and
Civil Rights Bills of 1866 secured the Freedmen "full and equal benefit of all laws,"
the former in Section 7, and the latter in Section 8. The Civil Rights bill was of
course passed over President Johnson's veto; and the Fourteenth Amendment was
drafted and adopted to remove all doubt about Congress's power in the premises.
Virtually every speaker in the debates on the Fourteenth Amendments-Republicans
and Democrats alike-said or agreed that the Amendment was designed to embody
or incorporate the Civil Rights Act. "Full and equal" therefore is strictly the canonical
reading. See Graham, mtpra note 4.
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therefore, but "full and equal" was the protection conceived and
accorded. It was only by one of the strangest perversions of the
English language on record that the word "separate" was warped
into use as a synonym for "full" and the disjunctive substituted
for the conjunctive.1  That "but" alone is the giveaway-a thorn
in the mind and conscience of every American to whom it is not
also an insult.
No Americans today ask or expect segregated Court systems
or legislatures. If a state Constitution provided for such, includ-
ing a "separate but equal" Supreme Court, no man would venture
to suggest that Negroes and whites were thereby "equally pro-
tected." Why? Because the very concept is odious. Yet the
main reason it is more odious in this one instance than in the others
is that 85 years of tolerationT5 and 57 of pretense"6 have blunted
our sensibilities to "separate but equal" in these other areas. The
racial standard is the sole basis for the distinction in either case.
Suppose that we grant for sake of argument, what no one is
obliged nor disposed to grant-that an outright majority of the
framers and ratifiers of 1866-68 did regard race segregation, in
their public schools, as a peculiar form of race discrimination-
as one which in their judgment, would remain unaffected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Does it follow-dare it follow-we to-
day are bound by that imperfect understanding of equal protec-
tion of the laws? 'Kust we, and our children, obliged to live in a
world, and assume moral leadership in a world,, only one-third of
whose population is white, where racism daily is becoming more
menacing and hateful, and a stain upon our national honor, must
we accept that understanding? Must we enforce that understand-
ing? For all time? Regardless? Can one generation fetter all
that come after it? Freeze standards of ethics? Rigidify law?
Did the generation that struck shackles from slaves, somehow
shackle our minds? Our conscience? Our common sense?
To ask such questions, is to answer them. The Doctrine of
Changed Conditions, applicable in constitutional cases, certainly
has special force and validity in this type of situation. Law can-
74. Plessy v. Fcrquson, supra note 6.
75 Early post-ratification interpretation of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amend-ments was quite in harmony with their purposes. See not only the Bradley-Woods deci-
sion at Circuit in the Slaughter-House Cases, 4 Fed. Cas. 891, No. 2,234 (C. C. D. La.1870), but also Judge Woods' decision in U. S. v. Hall, 22 Fed. Cas. 79, No. 15,282
(C. C. S. D. Ala. 1871) holding even that Congress had power to reach state inaction.See also the Thirteenth Amendment-Civil Rights Act cases: U. S. v. Rhodes, 27 Fed.
Cas. 785, No. 16,151 (C. C. D. Ky. 1866); Ma:ter of Elizabeth Turner, 24 Fed. Cas.337, No. 14,247 (C. C. D. Md. 1867). For the factors that deflected interpretation, see
Graham, supra note 4.
76. See id. for Plessy v. Ferguson, supra note 6, in historical perspective.
22
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-SCHOOL SEGREGATION
not exist in a vacuum. The equal protection of the laws must
always be, in part, an ethical and moral concept. It must grow
in relevance and fulfillment with "the felt necessities of the times,
• . .prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public
policy' 7 7 -ours and our childrens'; as well as our ancestors'.
Law office history, willy-nilly, is a confining, proscriptive en-
terprise. One never would suspect, for example, from the State
briefs and arguments in the present School Segregation Cases-.
that our Fourteenth Amendment had any ethical or moral content
at all. Still less, that the spirit and text must sometimes determine
intent. Much of the current pro-segregation argument reduces
simply to this: that because the Civil War generation still prac-
ticed discrimination, it could never have intended to abolish it.
Here again, Van Winkle 's research stands us in good stead. Such
a demoralized, emasculated equal protection, he pointed out, cer-
tainly was not the brand originally offered to the Supreme Court.
Roscoe- Conkling, indeed, was most emphatic on these matters.
The determinative point, Conkling declared, when arguing for
extension of the Amendment to corporations regardless of framer
intent, was the plain meaning and spirit of these words. "The
true question, in exploring the meanings of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, is not, in a given case, whether the framers foresaw that
particular case and acted in reference to it-the inquiry is, does
the case fall within the expressed intention of the Amendment.
All the cases compassed by the letter of the language, must be in-
cluded, unless obviously repugnant or foreign to its spirit and pur-
pose.,
7 8
After quoting the celebrated declaration to this effect, made by
Chief Justice Marshall in the Dartmouth College Case,79 Conkling
developed the point at some length, then concluded :80
Man being human, and his vision finite, it is well that saving
ordinances need not be shrunken in their uses or duration to the
measure of what the framers foresaw..
Truths and principles do not die with occasions; nor do they
apply only to events which have cast their shadows before.
The statesman has no horoscope which maps the measureless
spaces of a nation's life, and lays down in advance all the bear-
ings of its career.
77. HOLmES, THF ComtoN LAw 1 (1881).
78. Oral Argument of Roscoe Conkling [in San Mateo County v. Southern Pacific
Railroad, 116 U. S. 138 (1882)] pp. 31-32.
79. 4 Wheaton 518. 644-645 (U. S. 1819).
80. Supra note 78 at 33-34.
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All that wisdom and science in legislation can do, is to estab-
lish just principles and laws; this done, every case which after-
wards falls within them, is a case for which they were estab-
lished...
Those who devised the Fourteenth Amendment . . . builded
not for a day, but for all time; not for a few, or for a race;
[emphasis added] but for man. They planted in the Constitu-
tion a monumental truth. . . . That truth is but the golden
rule, so entrenched as to curb the many who would do to the few
as they would not have the few do to them.
May this persuasive eloquence, honored by a unanimous Su-
preme Court in 1886,11 soon take on new lustre and significance.
81. Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Ry. Co., 118 U. S. 394, 396 (1886).
